I wish to start with Norman Daniels's searching and perceptive "Nielsen and Rawls on Egalitarianism." As a kind of prolegomena that will immediately become relevant to my main remarks, I want first to say something about John Rawls. All my adult life, since *A Theory of Justice* first came out and after studying it carefully and being, like almost everyone else, duly impressed and influenced by it, I also set out, that notwithstanding, to argue that it wasn't egalitarian enough and criticized it and set forth what I called a radical egalitarian alternative to Rawls that was substantively socialist. This was most extensively developed in my *Equality and Liberty: A Defense of Radical Egalitarianism* (1985). But both before that (1979) and in a series of articles extending up to 1996 (some of which Daniels cites, including the latest one), I have (among other things) continued to argue that Rawls is not egalitarian enough. Repeatedly I have had to go back to the drawing board, having discovered that either my views concerning justice and equality really in no important ways differed from Rawls's (though, as Andrew Levine pointed out, we had a different political sociology) or that my claim to have a plausible view that was more egalitarian than his was mistaken. I think this was not principally due to my own stupidity, but to the intricate, nuanced, carefully interwoven, and systematic nature of Rawls's account. G. A. Cohen, certainly a resolute critic of Rawls, confided to me that he thought the greatest political philosophers we have are Plato, Thomas Hobbes, and Rawls and, substituting Aristotle for Plato, that is also what I would say.¹ We should, of course, be hesitant concerning such judgments about our contemporaries. Remember how many of his contemporaries put Herbert Spencer in there with Immanuel Kant. But,
vis-à-vis Rawls, I think something like that judgment of Cohen's and mine will stand. Still, caution is surely in order. But be that as it may, Rawls has a systematic, integrated, reflective, informed, and well-argued view that merits our repeated attention.

Daniels argues that my latest attempt also fails. That is, I do not show in my Oslo lectures (one of the papers Daniels attends to) that Rawls was not radical enough in his egalitarian justice. When I first read Daniels's article we have before us, I thought that he was right on about everything and that I was just wrong; on the second reading I thought he was in some very crucial matters probably wrong; and on the third, fourth, and last full reading I came to the conclusion that I thought I had a response with some adequacy and importance but I remained (and continue to remain) ambivalent.

Trying to move to something more determinate, I will first simply list the places where I still think he is clearly right and turn to the parts where I think that matters are more problematical. (1) He is right in claiming that and how Rawls's and Amartya Sen's views, as both Rawls and Sen agree, have converged into something very close to being in accordance and why and how taken together these views are very powerful indeed. I should only add that it is in an important part due to Daniels showing a key place where their views can plausibly be bridged. (When I was just finishing the last corrections on my page proofs, Amartya Sen's "What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?" Journal of Philosophy 103. no. 5 [May 2006]: 215–38, came into my hands. It generally puts into question that happy congruence. Nothing is written in stone.) (2) How from Rawls's simplifying device in using income in specifying the difference principle mistaken conclusions have been drawn (including my earlier one). Income and wealth do not correlate directly with the other primary social goods and we need to appeal to and clarify the index of primary goods. (Daniels also points out how this is not clearly done by Rawls.) (3) That in giving a reading of the difference principle we must avoid a moral rigorism that does not leave room for some agent-relative prerogatives. We must not be a Michael Kohlhaas or Kant's grandparents. (4) Daniels is also right in allowing for a conditional reading of the difference principle, one that undermines the claim that the difference principle must presuppose a social hierarchy or even social strata as a necessary feature of the human condition or, if you will, of social life. (5) I now agree that it is not the case that the difference principle, taken together with the other two of Rawls's basic principles of justice kept in their proper lexical order, only legitimately allows inequalities, including those resulting from incentives, if they are necessary to make the worse off as well off as possible. That ignores the importance of some agent-relative prerogatives.

So what is there left for Daniels and me to disagree about? Well, there is the part about what concessions (if any) we should make to a strict reading of the difference principle. We both wish to avoid moral rigorism, and agree that people need some room for agent-relative prerogatives, but what kinds are
legitimate and how we decide remains at issue between us. I agree with Daniels about his first alternative way of reading his Sophie, Max, and Ben cases. Their demands for incentives, I believe, fall within acceptable agent-relative prerogatives that can justly qualify an egalitarianism. We rightly make room for Max’s mildly self-interested choice concerning the pace of his life, and for Sophie’s devotion to her art; we leave Ben the room to meet the moral obligations, parental and filial, he has toward those for whom he has special affection. Moreover, all these cases, we agree, may slightly reduce equality in the world. But if we reflect, Daniels and I agree, we would not want—morally want—a world without room for such agent-relative prerogatives. Daniels concludes, “significant inequalities can be produced not only by reasonable self-interest, but also by affection for others, by moral requirements, and by other moral considerations that are not truly requirements” (italics mine). Perhaps that is so, but the Sophie, Max, and Ben cases do not show that. They do not generate any significant inequalities (on any plausible understanding of that) or perhaps any at all if we also consider as we should the effect on the worse-off as well as everyone else of having a society devoted to a moral rigorism that would reject such agent-relative alternatives. I want to maintain that where agent-relative prerogatives are disturbing it is where because of them significant enough inequalities arise: where some considerable harm would ensue if such agent-relative choices were not overridden. These agent-relative prerogatives should not be sanctioned as they should be sanctioned in the Sophie, Max, and Ben cases. Indeed by not sanctioning the latter (if generalized) we might make the worse-off significantly worse off.

The “high fliers” and the “selfish husbands,” if they occur in sufficient numbers or are high enough fliers or selfish enough husbands, do put significant dents in our legitimate equalities. But Daniels is not suggesting that, where they can be avoided, those inequalities resulting from agent-relative prerogatives should be accepted. But just when are agent-relative prerogatives to be accepted? When is an inequality a significant enough inequality to override an agent-relative prerogative? What constitutes “considerable harm”? No doubt we are not going to get an algorithm for any of these things. But it would be useful to get clearer about when agent-relative prerogatives override agent-neutral ones as well as when inequalities are significant. It certainly looks like where considerable harm would be done to others, agent-relative prerogatives are not overriding. But where is the cut between “considerable harm” and “inconsiderable harm”? Still, we would like to get a little better sense of when significant harm obtains and when it does not. (And is this like the analytic and synthetic: should we expect a sharp cut?) We may not even be able to get it there.

Consider, to help see the force of my above claims, two further cases of my own devising. Hans graduates from medical school in Denmark and practices medicine there for four years, but he also has always had deep interests in literature and in nature. On a visit to Greenland he falls in love with a small vil-
lage and its surrounding countryside. He has a small inheritance, enough for him to live frugally. He buys a small house, quits practicing medicine, and starts what he has always wanted to do, namely, to translate Shakespeare into Danish, hoping rather vaguely to replace the old translations with something that captures more adequately the poetic force of Shakespeare's English. But he is mainly motivated to translate Shakespeare for the sheer pleasure it gives him. As well, he loves the dark winter days in Greenland and the long summer sun glistening on the glaciers. He is indeed very happy with his new life. But suppose the village doctor dies and suppose the village and the surrounding territory is now without a doctor and, as would be evident, badly needs one. Suppose no doctor is available. And further suppose the villagers ask him to be their doctor, knowing that a replacement will be hard to get and particularly one who is both a Danish speaker and can speak Inuvik. Suppose he refuses, honestly preferring his solitary life as a translator and reminding himself and others that he did not settle there to be a doctor. It was only by chance that the villagers found out that he once had been one. Surely translating Shakespeare and living as he does is a worthwhile thing to do and a good way to lead his life: for him the best way to lead his life. But being a village doctor is no terrible way to live a life. If he starts doctoring he still will have some time (but not much) for translation. Suppose further that the extant translations are good and it is by no means clear that his translations would be superior or even get published. He may in effect be translating for himself for the pure joy of it. Is this agent-relative prerogative of his an acceptable prerogative in such circumstances? Can we rightly say he has a legitimate agent-relative prerogative? It seems to me that we cannot as we can, for example, in Sophie's case. The lives of a lot of people are at risk without a doctor, and a lot of otherwise needless suffering would occur. Significant harm—on any reading—would occur. The villagers should first try to talk Hans into practicing medicine there, at least until another doctor can be found. They should even offer him considerable incentives. Still, if even then he will not and no other doctor can be found he should be drafted by the government into practicing medicine there, just as people are drafted into the army, though considerable efforts should be made to find a doctor who can replace him. His life as a recluse translator is admirable, but the need for his services as a doctor is great and—let us suppose—he is not, for the time, at least, replaceable. That need for his services outweighs his own conflicting but admirable life choices. And a significantly greater equality would come for the villagers and people of the surrounding territory. So his services, until he can be replaced, should be required. He should be required to stay just as a draftee is required to stay with his unit. If this is a denial of liberalism or democratic equality, then so be it. I think, rather, it is a denial of extreme individualism. (Is "extreme" here a mark on my part of fanaticism?)

Consider now the case of John. He works as a schoolteacher in a remote village in the Northwest Territories. John has a rare blood type but is irra-
tionally afraid of giving blood or of blood transfusions. Suppose only one
other person in the village has the same type of blood as John and that that
person needs a transfusion desperately and immediately or he will die. There
is not time to fly the ill person out or to fly someone in with the same blood
type. Suppose John is informed of the situation but still will not give his
blood. He is too terrified at the prospect. Then I think he should as gently as
possible be strapped down, if necessary, and the needed blood taken from
him. That is deeply invasive—it runs against our ideas of self-ownership—and
is something we should be extremely reluctant to do. It is a violation of his lib-
erty rights, all right, but a person’s life is at stake and John will not actually be
physically harmed by the blood being taken, though his self-respect may be
damaged. He may feel like a violated person. But his irrationality should not
be allowed to cost another person’s life. Again in such situations agent-relative
prerogatives should not be taken as overriding. A person’s life is at stake. And
remember that human rights can and often do conflict with each other. Again,
if that is a denial of liberalism and in that context an overriding of the equal
liberty principle, then so be it. You don’t have to be a utilitarian, as Brian Barry
has well reminded us, to in certain circumstances give considerable weight to
consequential reasoning.

Perhaps our intuitions are clear here in particular cases? (However, some
not-unreasonable persons have intuitions here that are not the same as mine.)
Still we have—or so it seems at least—no general rule (or indeed rule, period)
concerning when agent-relative prerogatives can rightly be invoked. Yet in
such situations I think we should trust our intuitions, particularly if they
match with our reflective endorsements made in a cool hour, and even more
so if those reflective endorsements so made can be sustained impartially in
wide reflective equilibrium. Still, as far as I can see, we have no general rule,
even with the appropriate ceteris paribus clauses, telling us in a determinate
manner when agent-relevant prerogatives override non-agent-relative commit-
ments. We have the cases initially discussed—and are they not reasonably rep-
resentative ones?—where we have good reasons (as in Sophie’s, Max’s, and
Ben’s cases) to think agent-relative reasons are overriding and the agent-
relative prerogatives they permit are justified. But note that they are overriding
where no serious dents in an egalitarian ordering of things obtains. But what
counts as “a serious dent”? With my cases there will plainly be serious dents.
If that is so and if other situations are like mine in the cases I have just given,
we seem at least to have something that conflicts with political liberalism, at
least as Rawls construes it with a reliance on strong agent-relative prerogatives.
All this seems at least to be rather unsatisfactory. We can very well have a phi-
losophical itch to come up with a criterion or standard for “serious dents” here.
But are we likely to get one? And do we really need one? Isn’t it sufficient to
rely on our intuitions (considered judgments) here: our considered convic-
tions that we will continue to reflectively endorse? But can we get them here
without getting some acceptable generalizations into wide reflective equilib-
rium? We have some such generalizations, but they are vague. Will they not suffice? How would we decide? What kind, if any, criterion do we have (if any) for vagueness here? And do we need one? We can get in a fine philosophical fiddle here and perhaps unnecessarily so. We should remember Aristotle on not trying to gain more precision from a subject than what it admits of.

Political liberalism, something compatible on Rawls’s account with a liberal socialism, stresses that for all of us there must be a “choice space in which to pursue our conceptions of the good life, whatever they turn out to be.” But they must also be pursued “within the constraints imposed by the principles of justice that govern the basic structure of society.” What Rawls believes justice requires of us or permits us to do as individuals is constrained by these general matters. Daniels importantly, and I believe correctly, remarks:

The problem case for Rawls, [G. A.] Cohen says, involves the demand for inequality-producing incentives to do a type of work, or work at a level of productivity that individuals would otherwise honestly refuse to do. Cohen qualifies his claim that all such incentives are unnecessary and unjustifiable by admitting that people need some room for Scheffler’s concern about “agent-relative prerogatives.” They must be given room in which to give reasonable weight to their own interests, the interests of those they care about, and their obligations to those with whom they have special relationships. Otherwise justice becomes an unacceptable form of “moral rigorism” requiring us to be fanatical in our pursuit of justice. Nevertheless, Cohen thinks this concession leaves little room for generating inequality.

Still, there are things that individuals must do or be required to do, just as legally considered we must pay our taxes no matter what kinks that puts in our life plans. But the recognition and acceptance of this does not yield moral rigorism. There are cases, like the Sophie, Max, and Ben cases, where there is plenty of play for different life choices. But they do not involve situations where considerable harm occurs to the population affected by them resulting (among other things) in significant inequalities. That is another matter. Where harm or inequalities arise, it seems to me that then agent-relative prerogatives are rightly overridden.

II

I want now, considering the things that Daniels says in the last quarter of his paper, to strike (going against the current) something of a blow for a partial welfarism. I am no more of a welfare egalitarian than is Daniels, Dworkin, Scanlon, Rawls, or Sen. But I think it is a mistake in a world of considerable abundance to back away, after needs have been fully and equitably met, from an egalitarianism that seeks to meet certain kinds of wants. (Innocent wants and composable wants are what I have in mind.) And this I believe is compatible with
taking (as Rawls and Daniels do) the primary, though not the exclusive, subject of justice—the main target of justice—to be the basic structure of society. But that that structure must be principally aimed at meeting the needs of society is not to say that that is all that we should be morally concerned with and perhaps even as a matter of justice. Needs—and particularly basic needs—normally trump wants. But this is not to say that the satisfying of wants is not important too, and morally so.

Still, after we have verified the existence of three black swans, the showing of two white swans or even a thousand does not show there are no black swans. Analogously the showing of my other cases does not show that Daniels’s Sophie, Max, and Ben cases are not cases where agent-relative prerogatives do override agent-neutral ones. Thus, as I made clear at the end of the last section, I do not deny there are agent-relative prerogatives and that sometimes they are overriding. My intuitions (considered judgments) run along with those of Daniels here. My above point is that accepting them does little to damage equality—even radical equality. Indeed such agent-relative prerogatives being in place in such situations (e.g., the Sophie case) would enhance people’s life prospects all the way around and would (properly and contextually generalized) enable more people to live the way they want to live than would their denial. Having a morality that acknowledged this would be good for the worse off—make them less worse off—as it would for everyone else. We do not want—reflectively do not want—a Kantian moral rigorism. In some particular cases moral rigorisms might be justified, but it would generally make the worse-off better off to have a little lebenstraum in our moralities. My point was that when the agent-relative reasoning purportedly justifying agent-relative prerogatives comes to have some bite, comes to do tangible harm, making people (including most of the worse-off) still worse off than they already were, then agent-relative prerogatives, when this harm is significant, should be overridden. My two cases were designed to illustrate that. Are my intuitions too eccentric here? Am I too much of a consequentialist? I don’t think so.

III

Egalitarians seek to establish the case that to have a just social order—to have a well-ordered society—is to have an order where the needs of everyone in that society are equitably met. We try to establish a democratic equality where these needs are met and there is an assuring, by the way the structures of society are so ordered, that the capabilities of people in that society, where the people taken to be free and equal is acknowledged and protected. And it is assured that the capabilities of these people are equally respected. This is democratic equality, and it should play a large part in our lives. But we must figure out as well how to extend such a concern to the entire world—Haiti as well as Luxembourg. We need global justice as well as domestic justice: the equitable
meeting of needs of all people everywhere and always. But is anything like that, however desirable, even remotely possible?

Daniels rightly distinguishes between what we want and what we need. I would indeed like to see Daniels offered (if he wants it, and I would urge him to take it even if he doesn’t want it) to become secretary of health and welfare in a very different US regime than the one we are blessed with now. This would be on grounds of friendship and justice and more important for overall improving and socially stabilizing the health care of the United States. But if there are other equally clearheaded, knowledgeable, efficient, and progressive people around who would take the job, I would want it for him only on the grounds of friendship, not of justice. He does the same for my trivial but still genuine wine-loving wants. There are things we want for others on grounds of affection and friendship and there are things we want for them on grounds of justice, though affection may propel us in this way as well. There are also things we want on grounds of goodness—even something that may be good for all—that we do not insist on on grounds of justice. Daniels thinks my welfarist proclivities lead me in a mistaken way into claims of justice where only claims of goodness are relevant. Perhaps. “Let us try to see,” I say utterly nonironically.

Daniels remarks that my claim that justice includes satisfying our compossible wants when our needs are met leaves him somewhat puzzled. It seems to him that I have abandoned a focus on social obligations regarding basic institutions and tried to make justice focus on the individual and on the individual’s wants in a way alien to the task of justice as both Rawls and I see it. Not at all! I am talking about—admittedly very utopianly—the icing on the cake after the Rawlsian-Danielsian thing has been fully implemented and after the springs of social wealth on a worldwide scale flow freely (something, of course, that may very well never happen). I think in such a world, where superabundance obtains, for the fullest justice not just for individuals but for people generally to be built into the design of our basic institutions requires us to think as well of wants that are not needs or perhaps not even linked with capabilities. We, of course, should give needs priority, but wants should be counted too in a perfectly just society under conditions of superabundance and the advanced technology and the like that go with it.

I used to say, ten or fifteen years ago (though I update it somewhat in its present statement), that justice, both domestic and global, should be characterized as follows: When the springs of social wealth flow fully and the needs of human beings throughout the world are fully met and, ceterus paribus, equally met, as far as possible, given people’s differing needs, and where they have as well fair, equal opportunity to develop and exercise their capabilities, then, compatibly with this utopian achievement, all people should also have as much as possible of whatever it is they want that is compossible with all others having the same opportunities. This should obtain where for everyone what they want is also given equal consideration and where the wants in question are wants they would continue to have when they are aware of the causes of their wants and the consequences of having their wants satisfied and partic-
ularly when they are clear that having those wants satisfied is not to be had to the detriment of others. These are the compossible wants whose realization a good and just society and world would seek for all. Clearly such a principle needs considerable clarifying; for example, what does the “compossible condition” come to and what are the knowledge constraints involved? But I think the fullest possible conception of justice requires something in that ballpark. It requires a welfare component something like that.

Daniels would resist by saying the welfare component comes in not as a matter of justice but of what it would be to achieve the best world possible. I am less confident of the justice part than I used to be. (Here is a bit of my ambivalence.) But to the extent it became possible to achieve what my principle (principle of justice or not) requires, I think achieving this would yield the best possible world that it is logically possible to achieve, and I expect—neither of us being Kant’s grandfather—that Daniels would agree. Moreover, this—the justice issue for a moment aside—should be a fundamental aspiration—a utopian target—of an egalitarian for an egalitarian world. Does it not square with our aspirations? If we genuinely had a UN world confederation with those aspirations, would it not only be for the best world possible but as well (as part of that) yield the most just world possible? And should that not be our heuristic ideal? Would it not be something that the leaders of such a federation and the citizens as well, if they were egalitarians, would recognize as a heuristic desideratum of justice and of goodness? Is that not something that justice—the institutional justice of such a federation—would take to be a part of its heuristic ideal, something that part of ideal of a good and just world? Something, knowing they can only crudely approximate, to be taken as a guiding ideal: something they could measure their achievements against? Is this not something that people in this world federation would try to approximate as fully as possible? If the leaders did not seek to do so, would they be as just as we could hope the leaders to be? I think not. Again we must beware of construing things in too Kantian a manner.

But even if it is not a matter of what the fullest justice possible aspires to in a world of superabundance, it could—though not conflicting with what justice requires—be what a fully egalitarian vision of the good society would consist in. After Rawls’s, Sen’s, Dworkin’s, and Daniels’s justice-oriented accounts have been properly acknowledged, shouldn’t this acknowledgement of an ideally desirable world be made as well? It is the icing on the cake. But sometimes the icing may be very good, something devoutly to be desired. I want this wel-
farist aftertaste, and I do not see why Daniels should balk at it for himself and for others who still take justice to be the first virtue of society. It is important to remember that egalitarianism is not just about justice. Two social orders might be equally just but the first is one so structured that as many people as possible get as much as possible of whatever it is they on due reflection want that is compossible with the wants of others subject to the same constraints, that is, compossibility. Even if this society is not more just than the other
society both equally meeting the needs of all their citizens, would not the first society be still a better society than the second? The societies are equal in respect to the meeting of needs, but one society is also concerned with the maximizing, and as equally as possible, of the wants of all its citizens. Would it not be a better society than the one that just stuck with maximizing the equally distributed meeting of needs? Reasonable and rational people left with choosing between the two societies would, everything else being equal, chose the society with the welfare component. We could, and should, also substitute “worlds” for “societies” here.

However, and without taking back any of what I have said above, I feel that it is almost obscene to talk about wants and of satisfying wants in such an abundant world. That is Alice in Wonderland and too much like fiddling while Rome burns. The world we live in is not remotely anything like that, but is rather a swinish world in which vast numbers of people do not have clean water to drink, anything like a decent shelter, little if anything in the way of health care, little or no education at all, have a short life span, are brutally exploited (including children) in their workplaces (if indeed they are lucky enough to have employment), and so on—the horrors go on and on including what is in effect a renewal of slavery. The North, we should remind ourselves, is also no rose garden, but parts of it are a paradise compared to the South. (Compare Finland and Chad.) And what is clear enough is that this—or at least most of this—is quite unnecessary. I think it is mainly caused by capitalism, with its continued exploitation of the South. But even if I am too hard on capitalism, these are the real problems of justice that should be thought through and struggled about rather than talk about what we should have in the best of all possible worlds. It is understandable why Marx, who certainly was not at all indifferent to human ills, broke into belly laughs when the topic of moral philosophy was broached.

To this I respond ambivalently, and perhaps too much so, that what I was talking about is ideal theory and that perhaps when well done ideal theory has a point. I remain both attracted to ideal theory—and not just because it can be and is good clean fun for some—and repelled by it at the same time. I am rather at a loss about the relation between ideal theory and nonideal theory. John Dewey and (of all people) Charles Stevenson, with their insistence on a means-ends continuum, seem to me to be on the mark. We should not talk—indeed can hardly reasonably talk—of ends without attention to the means required for them. But from time to time we should perhaps think of—what it would be for God to be in his heaven and for all to be right with the world—what kind of world we should want and would reflectively endorse where the conditions are utterly ideal. There I think radical egalitarianism, with its welfare component, would have some part to play. But it should not deter us or distract us from coming to grips with the horrifying real world we face. That surely is our primary responsibility. That is where the action should be.

We can hardly but feel our inadequacy for such a task. We need to be the
contemporary equivalent of Renaissance people. Trying to do that, even with its formidable difficulties, with all the demands for knowledge it makes on us, should be at the center of our endeavors. And we philosophers cannot escape the burdens of this with some comforting (for us) remarks about an intellectual division of labor. (Surely Daniels, perhaps more than anyone, has done his homework here with respect to health care considerations.) Still some of us, in the very doing of that, should also allow a little time for such impractical, utopian speculation. Moreover, perhaps such speculation is not entirely impractical and feckless if qualified in that way. Knowing something of what our real life situations are, we would like to have a sense of how we could push things a little further in an emancipatory direction. It may in such a situation be helpful to have a sense of what kind of world we should, in our wildest most utopian dreams, desire. If we also have our feet firmly planted on the ground, such reflections may be a help in our gaining some sense of what it should be like to approximate it. And that (among other things) would be a situation where our wants, and particularly those that we would informatively and reflectively endorse, would be met. We must avoid not only the moral rigorism of which Daniels rightly speaks but also the rigorism of an overly Kantian conception of morality. A little dash of David Hume and perhaps Adam Smith would not hurt.  

NOTES

1. It might seem strange that neither of us, Marxians that we are, put Marx on that list. For my part it was because I do not regard Marx as a philosopher though, often unfortunately, he had his philosophical moments. I like to say, honestly but provocatively to raise hackles, that he was something better than a philosopher, i.e., a critical public intellectual and also an indefatigable social activist who was a trenchant critic of political economy, an economic historian (as Jan Elster has noted), and a radical revolutionary. I would conjecture that Cohen would agree with this. But that is my impression and I would not rush to claim this for him.


3. John Kerkhoven has asked me “Because many of us typically indulge each other’s wants in reasonable ways, isn’t your articulation here far too severe?” Where a sufficient harm obtains, and where having our wants satisfied brings this on, then satisfying them would be wrong. There would be disputes about when we have “sufficient harm,” but I think they could be resolved contextually.


8. Particularly in "Democratic Equality: Rawls's Complex Egalitarianism" (in *Cambridge Companion to Rawls*, ed. Samuel Freeman [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003]), Daniels stresses how Rawls had an egalitarian view for a democratic society and how it was a complex egalitarian view constantly interweaving his three principles of justice (the equal liberty principle, fair equality of opportunity principle, and his difference principle). It has also been emphasized how the later Rawls was setting out a political conception of justice for a liberal society. Perhaps with these things in mind it could be said I was pressing on Rawls a scope for his conception of justice that he was not aspiring to. Well I cannot see that we could have an adequate conception of political justice balkanized off from a thorough consideration of economic justice. And I cannot see how we can have an adequate conception of domestic justice in our increasingly interdependent world that is not also an account of global justice. See my comments in this volume on Idil Boran and Koula Mellos.