

moral costs of enforcement in mind. That is, we should at least try to find principles of justice that would gain sufficiently wide commitment, and voluntary compliance with the implementing taxation, that their enforcement upon the unconvinced will not require authoritarian government or bloody revolution. I will not attempt to say how to decide what to try next when this cannot be done, but I hope I have shown that it may be possible to establish limits on the magnitude of duties in justice by establishing amounts that duty-bearers cannot be expected to surrender, whatever the scope of justice. What those limits are I have failed even to begin to say.

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#### GLOBAL JUSTICE AND THE IMPERATIVES OF CAPITALISM\*

**B**OTH Charles Beitz and Henry Shue have made distinguished defenses of conceptions of global justice and have argued strenuously against limiting considerations of social justice to considerations of domestic justice.<sup>1</sup> However, they also clearly see that there is a problem about the relation of domestic justice to global justice, a problem acutely felt in the affluent societies of the world. There are millions and millions of desperately poor people, many of them malnourished, a not inconsiderable number of them starving. Must we, to do our duty here, pauperize ourselves until all basic needs are met? The strains of commitment here are very evident. We need to know the limits of our duties under conceptions of global justice.

What needs to be ascertained, at least if we construe things as Beitz and Shue do, is how much, as a matter of public policy, can be justifiably expected of affluent nations? Wherever we set that

\* Abstract of a paper to be delivered in an APA symposium on International Justice, December 30, 1983, commenting on papers by Charles R. Beitz and Henry Shue; see this JOURNAL, this issue, 591-600 and 600-608, respectively.

<sup>1</sup> Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton, N.J.: University Press, 1979), and Shue, *Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: University Press, 1980). See also Shue's review article of Beitz's book, in *Ethics*, XCII, 4 (July 1982): 710-719.

level, common-sense morality at least will believe that even affluent nations should, in redistributing resources, give greater weight to improving the well-being of their own domestic poor than to improving the well-being of the domestic poor elsewhere, even when their own domestic poor are better off than the foreign poor. More generally, there is the widespread belief that, as Shue puts it, compatriots take priority.

Beitz examines a variety of rationales for this common-sense belief and concludes that none are persuasive, though cumulatively the various considerations leave us with a complication for global justice. Even with a commitment to internationalism we cannot simply ignore local attachments. Where a government cannot both help its own poor and help the equally poor of another nation, the correct public policy for that nation is to help its own poor.

My reservations concerning the projects of both Beitz and Shue are about the relevance of ideal theory in such contexts, about the stress on the importance of the distinction between domestic and global justice, and over the emphasis given to the distribution of benefits and burdens. We need, as well, to be concerned about attaining or approximating equality in relations of power, and with avoiding the kinds of social structures, including modes of production, which place some in positions of dominance and control and place others in positions of submission and powerlessness. We need to see how this dominance and control work both domestically and internationally. It is crucial to look at the forms of social organization that produce and sustain relations of power and exploitation.

These considerations—of power rather than distribution—cut across questions about global justice and domestic justice by raising issues about pervasive class conflict, whether acknowledged as such by the protagonists or not, rooted in capitalist and “state socialist” domination of labor.<sup>2</sup> We will not get beyond an ideological understanding of how global justice requires a north/south redistribution, and what that redistribution is to consist in, if we see the issue as simply a conflict between affluent nation states and poor ones and do not understand it in terms of capitalist domination rooted in the imperatives of the capitalist mode of production. Until we see the situation in those terms, both what must be done to achieve a just world order and what a just world order will look like will be obscured.

An obvious response here is that these considerations of political sociology simply fail to take seriously the fact that normative polit-

<sup>2</sup> ‘State socialist’ is in scare quotes and is not a pleonasm.

ical theory, in doing ideal theory, is concerned with abstract models of what a well-ordered world should look like and thus can legitimately bypass such considerations. I shall argue that this at least seemingly plausible response is actually an evasion.

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Abstracts of Colloquium Papers to Be Read  
at the Eightieth Annual Meeting\*

TELEOLOGICAL EXPLANATION AND THE HIERARCHICAL  
ORGANIZATION OF NATURE

(V-E: Philosophy of Science)

This paper argues that the teleological model of explanation, explicated in terms of an evolutionary framework, provides a better framework for understanding the relations among the several sciences that deal with living systems, including human beings, than classical models of reduction. The reason is that the teleological framework recognizes the role of organization in constituting higher-level systems and in regulating the lower-level constituents of those systems. The history of research on fermentation in the nineteenth and early twentieth century is used to show the shortcomings of reductionistic research programs that tried to explain fermentation in terms of the chemical constituents of cells and ignored the role of organized pathways. The paper concludes with a discussion of how, within a teleological framework, inquiry at different levels can be viewed as providing guidance and constraints for inquiries at other levels without thereby doing the work that needs to be done at these other levels.

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THE DEMANDS OF JUSTICE

(II-F: Justice and Free Riders)

There is no general right to life or to welfare or to justice that can serve to ground claims for resources that people make on one another or on so-

\*Abstracts are here presented in alphabetical order, by author, with session number and colloquium title in parentheses, below the title of each paper. See the APA Program, this JOURNAL, supplement to this issue, pp. 665-675, for times and places.